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Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche
Matthieu Queloz
Amplifying Bernard Williams’s critique of the Nietzschean project of a revaluation of
values, this paper mounts a critique of the idea that whether values will help us to live
can serve as a criterion for choosing which values to live by. I explore why it might
not serve as a criterion and highlight a number of further difficulties faced by the
Nietzschean project. I then come to Nietzsche’s defence, arguing that if we distinguish
valuations from values, there is at least one form of the project which overcomes
those difficulties. Finally, however, I show that even on this reading, the project must
either fall prey to ‘Saint-Just’s illusion’ or fall back into the problems it was supposed
to escape. This highlights important difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project and
its descendants while also explaining whyWilliams, who was so Nietzschean in other
respects, remained wary of the revaluation of values as a project.
ABSTRACT
1. Introduction
W hich values should we live by? Is there some consideration thatcan function as a criterion by which to compare the values we have
with possible alternatives? Such questions, which have recently moved to the
forefront of philosophy again with the rise of conceptual ethics and conceptual
engineering, were of course a central concern of Nietzsche’s.1 Finding that the
values of Christian morality tend to stifle human flourishing by uniformly
encouraging self-abnegation and asceticism, Nietzsche formulates the project
of identifying and cultivating better values to live by, values thatwould enhance
1 See Cappelen (2018) and the essays collected in Burgess, Cappelen, and Plunkett (2020).
Cappelen and Plunkett (2020) open the volume with a programmatic quotation from
Nietzsche, in which he invites philosophers to be sceptical of all inherited concepts, make
new concepts, and persuade in their favour (WP: 220–21).
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life instead of stifling it.2 This is Nietzsche’s project of an Umwerthung der
Werthe—a phrase whose meaning ranges from a shift in to a reversal of values,
but which is usually translated as the ‘revaluation of values’. On the basis of his
doctrine that life is fundamentally will to power—in the technical and notably
formal sense of a second-order desire to overcome resistance in the pursuit
of first-order desires3—Nietzsche suggests that the corrective criterion for
determiningwhich values to live by should be whether a set of values ‘enhances
people’s feeling of power, will to power, power itself’ (AC: §2).4 As interpreters
have pointed out, there are also passages where the relevant criterion is spelled
out alternatively in terms of enhancing life, health, or flourishing.5 I shall refer
to this criterion as the vitality criterion, exploiting that label’s useful ambiguity
between power, life, health, and flourishing. Once a criterion is at hand, it can
be used to identify and adopt better values to live by. Simplifying wildly, I shall
refer to this enterprise in what follows as ‘the Nietzschean project’. Whatever
else Nietzsche may be up to,6 this project is clearly a central strand in his
thought.
And yet it is a project which Bernard Williams, though a fervent admirer
of Nietzsche and a self-proclaimed ‘Nietzschean’, always remained deeply
2 See Nietzsche (WP: 45–46, 522, 529, 545; GM: Preface, §§3–6; BGE: §4). See also Gemes and
May (2009); Leiter (2015); Reginster (2006); Richardson (2004: 81–94, 120).
3 I follow Reginster (2006: 11; 2018) in the interpretation of the much-debated notion of the
will to power.
4 The term ‘corrective criterion’ is Richardson’s (2013: §5). For the claim that life is will to
power, see Nietzsche (GM: II, §12; GS: §349; BGE: §§13, 259; AC: §6; eKGWB: 1884, 26[275]);
for the claim that the will to power doctrine yields the standard or criterion of revaluation,
see Nietzsche (GM: II, §2; eKGWB: 1885, 2[131, 185], 1886, 5[71], 1887, 11[74], 1888, 14[136]).
5 For accounts of the project of revaluation that variously spell out Nietzsche’s criterion in
terms of life, power, health, or human flourishing, see Clark (2015a), Gemes (2013), Guay
(2006), Katsafanas (2013b, 2013a), Leiter (2015), May (1999), Merrick (2018), Richardson
(2013), and Ridley (2005). For an account of the criterion as being less about the effects of
values than about the ideals they express, see Huddleston (2015, 2019).
6 Another strand is his critique of ascetic conceptions of values, which I have argued elsewhere
is logically prior to the revaluation of values; see Queloz and Cueni (2019).
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wary of.7 His grounds for doing so are, characteristically, as elusive as they
are suggestive. My main concern in this paper will therefore be to elucidate
and amplify his worries so as to articulate precisely what Williams’s critique
is, and what it can teach us about the difficulties faced by the Nietzschean
project.
Williams agrees with Nietzsche on three cornerstones of the Nietzschean
project: that genealogical inquiry can help us determine whether a set of
values has helped us to live; that where our own values are concerned, the
verdict will in many respects be negative; and that going forward, the question
is whether some other set of values will help us to live (2000: 160–161). But
Williams is adamant that this consideration ‘does not function as a criterion’
(2000: 161), and so he resists laying down the fourth cornerstone—the action-
guiding criterion—that would be required to support the Nietzschean project
of revaluation as an enterprise for practical deliberation.
It is not, of course, thatWilliams takes revaluations of values to be impossi-
ble: there clearly can be revaluations, because there obviously have been.8 The
point is rather that the possibility of a revaluation of values becomes doubt-
ful once that revaluation is conceived as a project rather than as a historical
phenomenon. Once conceived as a project, it properly becomes an object of
practical deliberation and calls for choices between the values we have and
possible alternatives. But unless they are to be arbitrary, these choices will
have to be guided by some criterion (even if, as some interpreters of Nietzsche
have suggested, that criterion is context-sensitive, personalized, or embod-
7 Pressed by Habermas to say whether he was an Aristotelian or a Wittgensteinian, Williams
answered (perhaps not altogether in earnest): ‘How about I’m Nietzschean?’ (1999a: 246).
For explorations of Williams’s debts to (or parallels with) Nietzsche, see Clark (2015a),
Katsafanas (2016), Leiter (manuscript), Prescott-Couch (2014), Queloz and Cueni (2019),
Queloz (2017, forthcoming-a; forthcoming-b: ch. 7), and Robertson and Owen (2013).
8 As Nietzsche himself argues (GM: I, §§7–10; BGE: §46).
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ied).9 And this is where the Nietzschean project goes wrong on Williams’s
view:
It is not—and this is vitally important—that an increase in power can serve
as a criterion of what interpretation or outlook we should adopt. We do not
survey a range of perspectives or sets of values and choose one by considering
the extent to which it will increase our power. (2006d: 327)
An ‘increase in power, in a sense adequate to Nietzsche’s purposes’, Williams
maintains, could not ‘be the criterion of anything’ (2006d: 327).
Interestingly, however, Williams’s critique of the Nietzschean project does
not simply stem from a disagreement over the substance of Nietzsche’s crite-
rion. Williams’s misgivings are deeper than that, and his critique all the more
powerful for being insensitive to what exactly the substance of Nietzsche’s
criterion is taken to be: he would resist the Nietzschean project on any inter-
pretation of the operative criterion, because he thinks that whether we should
move over in the direction of alternative values is, quite simply, ‘not a question
for deliberation or practical reason’ (2000: 161). It is a question to be answered
by life itself, and all we can deliberately do is discover after the fact how it was
answered:
It is not a matter of choosing some concept or image on the ground that it
will help us to live. It is a matter of whether it will indeed help us to live, and
whether it will have done so is something that can only be recognized first
in the sense that we are managing to live, and then later at a more reflective
level, perhaps with the help of renewed genealogical explanation. (2000:
161)
The crucial point, then, is that the merits of values as measured by some
criterion—not just the extent to which they serve the will to power, but any
criterion—can only be assessed retrospectively. The question whether ‘some
other ways of living, something which includes other ways of thinking about
9 See, e.g., Richardson (2013).
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living, will help us, or other human beings who follow us, to live’ (2000: 161),
Williams insists, does not function as a criterion.
Somewhat puzzlingly, Williams presents this as ‘one of Nietzsche’s most
important lessons’ (2000: 161). But how can it be Nietzsche’s lesson? Is it not
precisely the point ofNietzsche’s project that it takes that question as a criterion
and thereby empowers ‘free spirits’ to liberate themselves from the stifling grip
of inherited values and choose a better way to live? And more importantly,
why is it that neither an increase in power nor any other way in which values
help us to live functions as a criterion by which to choose values? Should it not,
or can it not? These are the questions I propose to address in what follows.
2. Williams’s Critique of the Nietzschean Project
One clue for why the question whether a set of values will help us to live does
not function as a criterion lies in Williams’s remark that other ways of living
include other ways of thinking about living. This means that as we consider
possible future values and evaluate them according to our present ways of
thinking about living, a different evaluative basis will be nested in the object
of our evaluation, and the question arises of which evaluative basis—which
standard—is the relevant one. Let us call the evaluation of possible future
values by the standard of our present values evaluation from here:
Evaluation from Here:
At t1, I evaluate, according to the vitality criterion as spelled out in terms
of my values Vt1, to what extent, at t2, a given set of alternative values, Vt2,
would help me to live.
The other possibility is to consider whether these values will be seen to help
us to live at t2 given the values we have at t2. Let us call this evaluation from
there:
Evaluation fromThere:
At t1, I evaluate, according to the vitality criterion as spelled out in terms
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of a given set of alternative values Vt2, to what extent, at t2, the values Vt2
would help me to live.
Themain thrust ofWilliams’s critique of theNietzschean project is to argue that
Evaluation fromHere is feasible but not relevant while Evaluation fromThere is
relevant but not feasible. Let us start with the relevance claim: it is a plausible
default assumption that what we—as Nietzschean revaluators—would really
like to know is how future values shape up from the point of view of those
who actually live by them. After all, they are the ones who have to live with
those values. But could there not be conditions under which we would have
reason to treat Evaluation from Here as the relevant standard? In order to be
able to say with confidence that Evaluation fromThere really is the relevant
standard for Nietzschean revaluators, we first need to grasp what conditions,
if any, would license privileging present values over future ones.
In ‘Persons, Character, andMorality’, Williams suggests that in order to be
justified in evaluating from here, i.e. in givingmy present values authority over
the life of my future self with different values, I would need an understanding
of how those future values relate to my present values, and that understanding
would have to be such as to vindicate my privileging my present values over
my future values. To illustrate this point, Williams discusses Derek Parfit’s
example of a Russian nobleman who knows he will inherit vast estates, but
whose socialist ideals now make him want to give those estates away when he
does so. To guard against a change of heart, the Russian nobleman arranges
for the estates to be given away automatically, and makes any revocation
conditional on the consent of his wife, whom he asks to disregard any future
change of mind on his part.10 In this case, Williams argues, it is not clear
that the nobleman’s present values really have more authority than his future
ones, for even if he has some story to tell about why his later values should be
discounted, it is not clear why that story should have more authority than the
10 See Parfit (1984: 326–327).
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countervailing story that he can expect his later self to tell about his earlier self.
As Williams puts it, he may have ‘a theory of degeneration of the middle-aged,
but then he should reflect that, when middle-aged, he will have a theory of
the naiveté of the young’ (1981: 10).
But we can easily think of an example where authority is more clearly on
the side of the present. When Odysseus instructs his men to tie him to a mast
as they approach the sirens and to disregard whatever orders he may give
once they get there, he is privileging his present attitude in light of a theory
explaining why his future attitude, under the influence of the sirens, counts
for less. He knows he will change his mind and ask to be freed, but he also
knows that he will only think that because he will come under the spell of
the sirens. This explanation relating his present to his future self vindicates
discounting the opinion of his future self.
Accordingly, in order for one’s present values to possess enough authority
to defeat one’s future values, two conditions would have to be fulfilled: first, one
would need what might be called a theory of change, a robust understanding
of how and why one’s future values came to differ from present ones; and
second, that theory would have to vindicate one’s present values against one’s
future values, thus explaining why these should count for less. This is true not
just where the person doing the evaluating and the person being evaluated
are the same person—though that case does raise problems of its own having
to do with personal identity11—but also at the level of society. The kind of
understanding relating successive outlooks to each other is often available
when it comes to relating past outlooks to present ones, because we have
access to many of the facts explaining how we came to be where we are; but it
is not, typically, available when it comes to relating present outlooks to future
ones. And absent such an understanding, there is no reason to think that
Evaluation from Here possesses more authority than Evaluation fromThere.
11 See Williams (1973a: 93; 1981: 9–10).
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Granted that Evaluation from There is the relevant standard, the issue
becomes that of its feasibility. Williams is clearer about the fact that he thinks it
unfeasible than about his reasons for thinking this. Two compelling rationales
can, however, be reconstructed from his remarks. The first is that the content
of future values is likely to be inaccessible to us; and the second is that even if
those future values were accessible to us in terms of their content, life with
those values would not be recognizable to us as an improvement except insofar
as it realized the values we now have.
The problem of the inaccessibility of the content of future values is high-
lighted by Williams when he writes that in contemplating a set of possible
future values we do not yet live by,
we cannot understand in advance what kind of power it will create, what
new forms of life it will make possible, or how those forms of life could
express human vitality—just as the ancients could not have foreseen the
distinctive shape of that world the creation of which [Nietzsche’s On the
Genealogy of Morality] claims to describe, a world centered on Christianity;
nor could they have understood how that utterly strange thing could come
to represent a new way of giving life a meaning. (2006d: 328)
Wemay be able vaguely to envision what would be involved in living with a
certain set of future values by situating them in a space of human problems or
concerns, or by characterizing them in terms of their effects. But this is merely
to consider these values from the outside, when what we really need is to
understand them from the inside, so that we can see what life looks like from
there. From where we are now, we may anticipate the coming of values that
are not the ones we presently have, but this is a long way from grasping what
it is that one values when one has those values, and why one values it. Insofar
as future values involve the introduction of genuinely new concepts that differ
both from those we now live by and from those we have inherited, we will not
be able to think the ethical thoughts expressible in terms of those concepts
(it is partly for this reason, Williams (2006c: 197) suggests, that Marxism and
many other ethical and political conceptions culminate in static utopias). Yet
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thinking the ethical thoughts expressible in terms of the future values at issue
is what one certainly must do before the question of one’s ability to evaluate
from these future values can even arise.
The second problem is that even if those future valueswere accessible to us
in terms of their content, living by those values would not be recognizable to us
as a genuine improvement except insofar as it served values we shared already.12
What would be recognizable to us is that to them, i.e. to the possible future
agents living by those values, it would be recognizable as an improvement;
but that does not make it a genuine improvement in our eyes. For even if
we understood that the envisioned life was going better, by the light of some
future values, than our life was going according to our values, this would still
not amount to an ethical judgement that the envisioned life was simply going
better and we should move towards it. From where we are now, any picture of
future human life that failed to embody the values we now live by would elicit
a sense of loss. As Williams puts it,
we cannot overcome our outlook. If a possible future that figures in those
shadowy speculations does not embody some interpretation of [the] central
elements of our outlook, then it maymake empirical sense to us—we can see
how someone could get there—but it makes no ethical sense to us, except
as a scene of retrogression, or desolation, or loss. (2006c: 197)
To those future people with different values, it would of course not appear as a
scene of retrogression, or desolation, or loss. But the point is that this vicarious
judgement is not an ethical judgement in the relevant sense. We cannot, in
the relevant sense, try on values for size. What we can do, as Williams himself
insisted (1986: 203), is take up the ethnographic stance and imaginatively inhabit
an evaluative viewpoint—that of a different contemporary culture, or that of
12 Thus, when someone in a slave-holding society envisages a possible future society without
slavery, the measure of the improvement this would bring is provided by the values the
society has already. What is at issue in Williams’s critique are even more radical changes
recognizable as improvements only as measured by values they themselves instil. I am
grateful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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a culture in the past—without fully making it our own.13 But even if we had
enough of a grip on a future evaluative viewpoint to imaginatively inhabit it,
so that we could see how someone inhabiting that viewpoint would evaluate
things, this remains crucially different from actually evaluating them. To
actually evaluate them is to make sense of them in an ethically engaged way.14
This yields judgements of the form: ‘Values V help/do not help people to
live’. To evaluate them vicariously, by contrast, is to make sense of them in an
ethically disengaged way. This yields judgements of the form: ‘To people with
values V, it looks like these values help/do not help them to live’. But this is
not to express or take up an ethical stance towards those values. The force of
the two judgements is different—only the judgement expressing values one
actually holds is what might be called a full-throated ethical evaluation, while
the vicarious judgement is a disengaged evaluation more akin to a proposition
of anthropology. Even if future values were accessible to us in terms of their
content, therefore, they would still not be accessible to us as a basis of full-
throated ethical evaluation. Imaginatively inhabiting a future in which values
we do not share are successfully realized does not get us past the fact that
insofar as this future fails to realize values we actually have, it can only make
ethical sense to us as a scene of retrogression or loss.
The vitality criterion is no help here, because what counts as an expression
of vitality—as an increase in people’s feeling of power, will to power, or power
itself, for example—is similarly sensitive to one’s actual outlook. The power
13 See also Williams (1995c: 206; 1995b: 239; 1995e: 185–187; 1996: 29; 2006b: 61).
14 The engaged/disengaged terminology hails fromMoore (2006). A helpful account of the
distinctive form of agency involved in aspiring to acquire values one does not yet possess
is Callard (2018). More decision-theoretic framings of related problems are discussed in
Ullmann-Margalit (2006) and Paul (2014). Eklund (2017) explores how the possibility
of alternative normative concepts relates to certain forms of metaethical realism, and in
particular whether it is possible for concepts with the same normative role to have different
referents—a focus which renders it orthogonal to the Nietzschean concerns at issue here,
however.
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that a different way of life will embody ‘will not reveal itself as recommending
it until it is a power that someone already possesses’ (Williams 2006d: 329).
It might be objected that this rather overstates the difference between
values we live by and values we do not live by. After all, we seem to manage
well enough when it comes to evaluating whether the values of past societies
have helped them to live by their own lights as opposed to ours. Some societies
were clearly disasters on their own terms, and our ability to understand this
becomes important when we seek to explain why some societies decided to
move away from slavery or honour killings, for example. Indeed, our capacity
for this kind of detached retrospective judgement seems to be presupposed
by Williams himself when he grants Nietzsche that genealogical inquiry can
reveal to what extent values have proved life-promoting in the past (unless
the idea is to assess even values from the distant past only by our present
values—an exercise whose result for large swathes of history can only be so
indiscriminately negative as to be futile). What is so different about future
values?
The answer is that both with regard to the accessibility of future values in
terms of their content and with regard to their accessibility as an evaluative
basis, there are important asymmetries between the past and the future. One
is what we might call the hermeneutic asymmetry: while past societies used
to make ethical judgements that we no longer make, we often still take the
content of those judgements to be accessible to us, because the terms in which
they were articulated have been handed down to us. Ethical outlooks may
have been lost, but our picture of a lost ethical outlook is paradigmatically one
where the terms in which that outlook was expressed have not been lost. By
contrast, future ethical outlooks have yet to arise, but our picture of a future
ethical outlook is one where the terms in which that outlook will be expressed
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have not yet arisen either. As a result, the content of many past outlooks is
accessible to us in a way that the content of future outlooks is not.15
In addition, Williams suggests that there is also an asymmetry between
past and future with regard to the second problem of the inaccessibility of
future values as an evaluative basis, an asymmetry which might be labelled
the identification asymmetry. We can explore our present values ‘on this side,
in relation to their past, and explain them’, and in contemplating the past, ‘we
can identify with the process that led to our outlook because we can identify
with its outcome’ (Williams 2006c: 197).That history presents alternative ways
of living merely in terms of a wider ‘us’, because we have available to us a story
detailing how ‘they’ became ‘us’. But with regard to the future, that story has
yet to be written. As a result, we find it much harder to identify with ‘them’ as
a future ‘us’. This in turn makes it much harder to identify with their future
values, since on Williams’s account, historical narratives about how a society
came by its values enable the society to make sense of its values as its own
(2006c: 193–197; 2006d: 328–329). Without this kind of narrative continuity,
we cannot identify sufficiently with values other than those we now have to
be able to evaluate from them. And the identification asymmetry is that while
such narrative continuity often obtains (or is taken to obtain) between the
past and the present, it is lacking between the present and the future. This is
why Williams writes that ‘we cannot in our thought go beyond our outlook
into the future and remain identified with the result: that is to say, we cannot
overcome our outlook’ (2006c: 197).
We thus reach the conclusion that the prospective value of another set of
values, to the extent that we even understand it, will have to be judged in terms
of its tendency to promote the values we already have, while the respects in
which adopting this different outlook promotes values it itself instils will only
be recognizable retrospectively.
15 See Williams (2006e: 174–175).
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These hurdles might encourage one to think that Nietzsche’s vitality crite-
rion needs to be construed in maximally perspective-independent and neutral
terms. This would give us a neutral standpoint from which to identify a set of
values which, by that criterion, would be absolutely best. But this, quite apart
from being dubious as a reading of Nietzsche, would certainly be a mistake in
Williams’s eyes. In ethics, Williams maintains, we should not try and deter-
mine which values are absolutely best according to some maximally abstract
and perspective-neutral standard.16 This is not merely the trite point that we
cannot do so, because we cannot entirely stand back from our values if we are
to evaluate alternative values. That is also true—as Williams puts it, there is
no Archimedean standpoint, and even if there were, it is a standpoint from
which we could not decide the respective merits of values, because we would
shed the evaluative resources to do so in striving for what George Eliot called
‘that bird’s eye reasonableness which soars to avoid preference and loses all
sense of quality’ (1999: 814).17
But the fact that one needs to evaluate from something would be allowed
for as long as one had the vitality criterion as an evaluative basis. Williams’s
objection is not just that there is no Archimedean standpoint, but that the very
urge to move towards such a standpoint, while legitimate in science, is out of
place in ethics. Ethics is radically first-personal in a way that science is not,
and it is a misunderstanding of ethical evaluation to think that we should aim
to be ‘unencumbered intelligences selecting in principle among all possible
outlooks’—it is a ‘scientistic illusion’ to think that it is ‘our job as rational agents
to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a system of political
and ethical ideas which would be the best from an absolute point of view,
a point of view that was free of contingent historical perspective’ (Williams
2006c: 193–94). Bringing my personal loyalties and attachments to bear on
ethical evaluation is not necessarily a distortion to be avoided, because the
16 Williams (1995d: 164–170; 2003; 2006c: 193–94).
17 This is a central theme in Williams (2011: esp. ch. 2).
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evaluation is not just incidentallymine: ‘my life, my action, is quite irreducibly
mine, and to require that it is at best a derivative conclusion that it should
be lived from the perspective that happens to be mine is an extraordinary
misunderstanding’ (Williams 1995d: 170). Hence, the very ambition to rank
values according to some perspective-neutral criterion that will tell us which
are absolutely best is a scientistic misunderstanding of ethics. In ethics, the
Archimedean urge must be resisted.18
For Williams, then, Nietzsche’s question whether some other set of values
will help us to live both cannot and should not function as a criterion. It cannot
function as a criterion if it is construed in terms that render it sensitive to the
content of the evaluative outlook under consideration, because that renders the
only version of the criterion that is accessible to one irrelevant. And it should
not function as a criterion if it is construed in content-neutral terms, because
that would embody a scientistic misunderstanding of the ethical evaluation at
stake. So either way, the question does not function as a criterion.
In addition to this main line of criticism, Williams also sees a number
of other structural difficulties for the Nietzschean project which, while they
do not in principle threaten the idea that one might choose values on the
basis of the vitality criterion, nonetheless highlight some serious epistemic
and practical hurdles. These are worth attending to also because they are
revelatory of howWilliams interpreted the project itself.
First, Nietzsche conceives of his project in overly individualistic terms
on Williams’s view. His ‘models of overcoming and transforming our values,
which is his most enduring concern’, Williams points out, ‘tend to be personal,
individualistic, occasionally heroic’ (2006d: 327). Often, the undertaking ‘is
regarded as an expression simply of a personal endeavour, like that of an
artist; sometimes it takes on an historically transformative note, as though the
individual’s feat of transvaluation will itself change society’ (2006d: 327). In
18 The phrase ‘Archimedean urge’ hails from Srinivasan (2015).
15 • Matthieu Queloz
opposition to this individualistic model, Williams insists that values come in
socially shared webs which individuals, however heroic, would be powerless to
change on their own.19 The project is also overly individualistic in a different
sense, moreover: there is something remarkably apolitical about considering
the question of what values an individual should live by in order to flourish
in isolation from the political order in which these values are expressed. That
orderwill itself reflect political values, and the question ofwhat personal values
would help a given individual to live cannot be answered independently of
the question of what political values a society should embody. But as Williams
repeatedly emphasizes, Nietzsche betrays a severe lack of sensitivity to the
political dimension of his concerns.20
Second,Nietzsche’s conception of his project is too voluntaristic: we cannot
simply choose to value something, for in order to succeed in valuing it, we
need to be able to make sense of it as valuable, and what ‘makes sense to
someone is not, in any connection, a matter of will’ but rather ‘comes as a
discovery’ (Williams 2002: 261–62). What determines whether something
can make sense to us as valuable? Williams highlights two conditions.21 On
the one hand, it must engage our ethical emotions, and whether it does so
depends, not on an act of will, but on one’s education, socialization, and other
processes by which one has cultivated a certain emotional sensibility. On the
other hand, it must be conceptually articulated and intelligibly related to other
things that we value, as instantiating, bearing, expressing, or facilitating them,
so that there can be an answer to the question of what it is about something
that one values. Merely understanding that adopting some value would help
us in some respect does not yet suffice to internalize that value. In a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, for example, understanding that I have instrumental reason to come
19 See Kusch (2009) and Queloz (2018; forthcoming-b: ch. 7) for further discussion of this
aspect of Williams’s conception of values.
20 See Williams (1999b: 150; 1999a: 257; 2006d: 326–327; 2012: 141).
21 See Williams (2002: 91–92; 2006a: 135–137).
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to treat the welfare of other players as intrinsically valuable provides no stable
ground for me to do so: if all I have to support the value I am trying to reason
myself into is the thought that I have reason to treat it as a value, this will not
be enough for me to make sense of it as a value, and my attempt to pretend
otherwise will unravel upon reflection.22 It must be possible to say more about
why something is valuable. As long as we remain unable to do so, the value
remains humanly unintelligible. Isaiah Berlin offers a vivid illustration of this
point:
If I find men who worship trees, not because they are symbols of fertility
or because they are divine, with a mysterious life and powers of their own,
or because this grove is sacred to Athena—but only because they are made
of wood; and if when I ask them why they worship wood they say ‘Because
it is wood’ and give no other answer; then I do not know what they mean.
(1997: 10)
Williams’s own example is the value of truthfulness: the Greeks made sense
of truthfulness as a value by relating it to other things that they valued, such
as honour and nobility of character; later societies have made sense of it
in different terms, by relating it instead to notions of freedom and absence
of manipulation; but in each case, people could coherently make sense of
truthfulness as a value because that value was fleshed out and supported by
its connections to other things of value.23 When we discover that something
makes sense to as a value, part of what we discover are these connections to
other things that we value. But such connections cannot be forged by an effort
of will. Hence, we cannot simply choose to value something.
Third, new thoughts have to be generated out of the material made avail-
able to us by history. We ‘do not make our thoughts out of nothing’ (Williams
2006d: 327), and societies can no more transcend their historical conditions
in this respect than individuals can transcend their social conditions. Part of
22 This is howWilliams attacks Gauthier’s (1986) proposed solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Williams 2002: 91).
23 See Williams (1973b; 1997: 26; 2002: 89–92, 115; 2006a: 136).
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Williams’s point is that since nothing comes from nothing, innovation is sub-
ject to developmental constraints or path dependences: new valuations have
to be forged out of the old ideas we have inherited by combining, elaborat-
ing, or extending them; moreover, taking up once more the idea that values
have tomake sense to us as values—merely recognizing the practical neces-
sity of coming to see something as valuable does not suffice actually to do
so—the conceptual material in terms of which we make sense of these better
values will itself have to be drawn from our conceptual inheritance. But there
is also an internalist rationale for highlighting the constraints imposed by our
conceptual inheritance: for an internalist about reasons such as Williams, the
very reasons for adopting new values will have to tie in with antecedent mo-
tivational states, the content of which will have to be articulated in terms of
extant concepts. One’s conceptual inheritance does not just impose limits on
what values one can adopt, therefore, but also on what values one can find
that one has reason to adopt.
Fourth, Williams adds that the material out of which we develop values
is in many respects obscure to us, because we only dimly and incompletely
understand what the ideas we inherit entail, where they conflict with one
another, and what historical deposits they carry with them. Our thoughts and
ideas are the product ‘of an obscure mixture of beliefs (many incompatible
with one another), passions, interests, and so forth’ (2005: 12–13), and when
new thoughts and ideas form, these ‘come in part from what is around us,
and we have a very poor grasp, for the most part, of what their source may be’
(2006d: 327). In addition to being limited in the values we can adopt or have
reason to adopt, we are thus also epistemically limited in our understanding
of where and what we draw these values from.
Finally, these epistemic limitations apply even more severely with regard
to the future consequences of adopting possible values. We have difficulties
anticipating what the effects of adopting a value will be, because too many of
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the consequences of concept use are unintended by and opaque to concept-
users:
What ideas actually do is not under the control of their creators, and is rarely
what their creators intend.Their ideas may help to shape other people’s aims,
but they are more deeply at the mercy of those other people’s needs, and of
opaque historical contingency. (Williams 2006d: 327)
Wemay think we have a firm grasp of the practical consequences of adopting a
value. But a value that has beneficial consequences in one set of circumstances
may have pernicious consequences in another set of circumstances; moreover,
as the value comes to be adopted by an increasing variety of people, it will
also be adapted to their needs and situations in ways that may alter both the
value and its practical consequences. Once in circulation, a concept is open
to appropriation, reinterpretation, and repurposing by others in ways that
render its net effect on human lives extremely difficult to foretell. Nietzsche’s
own ideas of the will to power or the Übermensch—appropriated, distorted,
and exploited by just the nationalistic and anti-Semitic movements he himself
despised and deplored—are a case in point.
In the face of all these structural problems for the Nietzschean project,
Williams concludes that there can be no question of making a criterial choice
between the values we have and the values we might come to live by—‘there
is no way in which, in these fundamental respects, the understanding of life
can get ahead of life itself’ (2006d: 328). All we can do is recognize whether
or not the values we have help us to live, as measured by those same values.
Whether that is the case will be immediately manifest in howwe are managing
to live, and, as Williams’s pointer to genealogical explanation indicates, it will
be manifest in retrospect in how we and others have managed to live in the
past. But there is no room for a prospective criterial choice between values.24
24 A reviewer points out thatWilliams’s critiquewill seem to have less bite if one readsNietzsche
as advocating what is sometimes called moral ‘experimentalism’ (Bamford 2016; Hunt 1991:
ch. 7), which invites one to experiment with new values and evaluate them as one goes
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3. A Mere Reversal of Valuations
Before we come to Nietzsche’s defence, it is worth noting that many of the
ideas that Williams deploys against the Nietzschean project are very much
Nietzschean ideas. Most notably, there are several places where Nietzsche
proves mindful of the perspectival character of the criterion for whether
something helps or hinders the attainment of the ‘highest power and splendor
of the human type’ (GM: Preface, §6). He does not take himself to be in a
position to say—indeed clearlywishes not to say—what this future human type
should look like. The notion of the highest power and splendour of the human
type functions as a placeholder: unlike Aristotle, Nietzsche does not believe in
a constant anduniformhuman nature fromwhich an absolute, one-size-fits-all
notion of the ‘full realization’ of humannature couldbe derived. Andunlike the
Christian morality he opposes, he does not believe that there is a one-size-fits-
all ideal of a human being which unites all definitively desirable properties.25
As he says, the point is precisely not ‘to direct and edify, to maintain one’s
own type as the first and highest’ (eKGWB: 1888, 14[225]). He condemns as a
relic of the ‘Christian prejudice’ the ‘optical habit’ [optische Gewöhnung] of
estimating the value of the human being according to how close it comes to
some ‘ideal human being’ (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]): ‘one thinks one knows what,
with regard to the ideal human being, is of definitive desirability’ (eKGWB:
1887, 11[226]). But ‘any careful examination of this “ideal type”’ will lead one
to abandon it immediately. It is the ‘Christian ideal’ that leads one to ‘think
one knows, first, that approximation to One single type is desirable; second,
what this type is like; third, that any deviation from this type constitutes a
along. But either the choice of which values to move over to and experiment with is a
rationally grounded choice, in which case even the experimentalist reading remains—at
least where radical value experiments are concerned—vulnerable to Williams’s point that
the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself, or the choice is an initially arbitrary
choice that then proves its worth in the course of the experience of living by those values,
in which case the experimental reading ends up conceding Williams’s point.
25 See Leiter (2015) for a valuable discussion of this point.
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decline, an inhibition, a loss of strength and power for mankind’ (eKGWB:
1887, 11[226]). These and other passages suggest that Nietzsche is keenly aware
that the assessment of whether a set of values helps us to live depends on who
and where we are.
Similarly, many of the other issues Williams raises arguably turn on Ni-
etzschean ideas. The idea that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of
life itself is sometimes attributed to Nietzsche under the heading of ‘experi-
mentalism’.26 That the sources and consequences of our thoughts are in many
respects opaque to us is a leitmotif throughout Nietzsche’s work, and his con-
ception of a revaluation of values is less naïve than Williams’s critique may
lead one to think:
To revalue values—what would that mean? The spontaneousmovements
must all be there, the new, future, stronger ones: it is only that they still
stand under false names and valuations and have not yet become conscious
of themselves. (eKGWB: 1887, 9[66])
Any doctrine is pointless if all the accumulation of forces and explosive ma-
terials it demands are not yet in place. A revaluation of values is achieved
only when there is a tension from new needs, from the newly needy [Neu-
Bedürftigen], who suffer from the old valuation without coming to conscious-
ness [ohne zum Bewußtsein zu kommen]. (eKGWB: 1887, 9[77])
As these little-known passages bring out,Nietzsche does show some awareness
of how the success of the project of revaluation depends on the necessary
material and the necessary driving forces being available in society. He knows
that individuals cannot transcend their social and historical conditions, that
they do not create their thoughts ex nihilo, and that the understanding of life
cannot get ahead of life itself.
In effect, Williams channels one current in Nietzsche’s thought to drive
back another, and as we saw at the beginning, Williams himself conceives of
what he is doing in these terms: he presents the main point of his critique as
26 See Hunt (1991: ch. 7) and Bamford (2016).
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‘one ofNietzsche’smost important lessons’ (2000: 161); he prefaces his criticism
of the idea that one might anticipate the effects that adopting a value will
have with the claim that this idea ‘belies one of [Nietzsche’s] thoughts’ (2006d:
327); he notes that the individualistic or artistic model of value creation ‘is
not true to much else that Nietzsche believed’ (2006d: 327), and remarks
that while Goethe’s dictum, ‘in the beginning was the deed’, was not in fact
cited by Nietzsche, it ‘might well have been’ (2006d: 328). In a conciliatory
tone, Williams also emphasizes that Nietzsche was anyway keener on spelling
out the character traits of creators of values than on spelling out the content
of their values (2006d: 329), and he intriguingly suggests at one point that
Nietzsche’s individualismmight be a feature of hismode of presentation rather
than a substantial commitment about how the revaluation of values actually
works, because ‘a social process which in actual fact no doubt has many stages,
discontinuities, and contingencies . . . can be illuminatingly represented on the
model of a certain kind of psychological strategy’ (2000: 158). Since Nietzsche
anticipates much of the Williamsian critique, and since Williams himself is
aware of that fact, the Williamsian critique can thus be seen as an internal
critique of Nietzsche’s thought.
Even conceived as an internal critique, however, the Williamsian critique
seems to leave us at precisely the point in Nietzsche’s intellectual development
where Nietzsche had the means to make sense of a devaluation of values, but
not of a revaluation of values: roughly, it vindicates the Nietzsche of Human,
All Too Human against the more ambitious Nietzsche of Daybreak and later
works.27
But perhapswe can come to the defence ofNietzsche’s ambitions by specify-
ing more carefully how ambitious the envisaged revaluation itself is supposed
to be. Revealingly, Williams takes it to be quite ambitious: he writes that Ni-
etzsche ‘leaves us for the most part with an image of some solitary figure
27 See Owen (2007: 20) and Ridley (2005).
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bringing new values into existence’ (2006d: 327), and that although he ‘rightly
foresaw’ that the false presuppositions of many of our present values ‘would
one day come to be generally recognized’, he ‘almost completely failed in his
visionary attempts to grasp what could take their place’ (1984: 255).
As we noted at the beginning, however, the GermanUmwerthung suggests
a shift in or a reversal of values rather than the wholesale de novo creation of
values, and, especially in the work that until the last minute was to be called
The Revaluation of All Values (and which Nietzsche eventually retitledThe
Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity), Nietzsche can give the impression that
his chief concern is not to create new values ex nihilo, but to reverse the polarity
of existing valuations in order thereby to undo the revaluation of values that
brought usChristianity.28He even singles out the Renaissance ofCesare Borgia
as the time that came closest to completing just the revaluation of values
that Nietzsche advocates: the replacement of Christian values by ‘opposite
values, noble values’ (AC: §61).29 AsDavidOwen (2018: 73–75) and others have
argued, these values are humanistic values encouraging the continual setting
and overcoming of ideals in this life rather than the next. Roughly, they are
the values of Renaissance virtù, which Nietzsche liked to call ‘moraline-free
virtue’ (AC: §2; eKGWB: 1887, 10[45, 50, 109], 11[43, 110, 414], 1888, 15[20]).
Particularly in his late work, there are thus passages in which Nietzsche
seems to understand ‘revaluation’ not as a bringing into existence of new
values, but merely as an inversion of our present valuations aiming to bring
back valuations that formerly existed. Of course, for each of these passages,
there are countervailing passages where Nietzsche speaks of the need for
28 See, e.g., Stern (2018).
29 Borgia was the son of the Pope, and had he not fallen ill, this ruthless operator—Machiavelli’s
model for the Machiavellian—might well have become Pope himself, something which
Nietzsche thought would have spelled the end of Christianity. As Jacob Burckhardt already
remarked, Borgia ‘could have secularized the States of the Church, and he would have been
forced to do so to keep them . . . He, if anybody, could have . . . annihilate[d] the Papacy’
(1990: 88).
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‘law-givers’ and ‘creators’ of new values while studiously avoiding to specify
what these future values should look like (GS: §§301, 335; BGE: §§211, 253; EH:
‘Fate’, §4; TSZ: Preface, §9; eKGWB: 1884, 26[243], 1886, 6[25], 1887, 11[411]).30
And even where he talks about the ‘fear-inspiring consistency’ with which the
‘aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy =
beloved of God)’ was inverted to suggest that the ‘miserable’, ‘poor’, ‘powerless’,
‘suffering’, and ‘ugly’ were beloved of God (GM: I, §7), it is clear that some
values are exempt from this inversion: the rank order between truthfulness
and lying, for example, is not inverted.31
But the point remains that at least insofar as revaluation issues only in
new valuations rather than in new values, it merely requires changing the
valence of existing concepts. The distinction between valuations and values
therefore gives Nietzsche the means to resist Williams’s critique. Insofar as
the idea is to revert back to valuations that have helped us to live in the past,
revaluation can be guided by retrospective assessments of what kinds of lives
values historically tended to foster. There will then be no need to evaluate
values whose content we do not yet grasp and whose effects on society we
cannot fathom. Nor will one need to create entirely new ways of thinking. One
will only need to present the properties and character traits in terms of which
we already think in a contrasting moral light. In that sense, the revaluation
of values involves not value creation, but merely the old rhetorical strategy
that Quintilian termed the paradiastolic redescription of virtues as vices and
vices as virtues—a redescription, moreover, which by Nietzsche’s lights is just
the reversal of a previous redescription along these same lines.32 The title Der
Anti-Christ, which in German can also meanThe Anti-Christian, then appears
30 On Nietzsche’s ambition to create values, see Clark (2015b), Dries (2015), Langsam (2018),
and Lambert (2019).
31 For different attempts to explain why the rank order between truthfulness is not inverted,
see Owen (2007: 70) and Queloz (forthcoming-a).
32 The connection to paradiastolic redescription is also drawn by Skinner (2002: 185), Owen
(2018), and Srinivasan (2019: 144).
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well-chosen: Nietzsche characterizes what he advocates negatively, as a mere
reversal of Christian valuations.
4. Saint-Just’s Illusion
Even this mere reversal of existing valuations must seem suspicious to
Williams, however, for its optimism that formerly helpful values can be safely
revived and expected to work just as well for us, under our very different
circumstances, is precisely what Williams attacked under the heading of
‘Saint-Just’s illusion’.33 Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, the French revolutionary
who became Robespierre’s right hand and is often seen as the purest embod-
iment of the Jacobin ideology (his angelic features and steely ruthlessness
during the Reign of Terror earned him the sobriquet ‘Angel of Death’), tried
to recreate, in eighteenth-century France, an ideal of civic virtue drawn from
Roman antiquity. ‘Let Revolutionists be Romans’ (2004: 820), he urged. ‘The
world has been empty since the Romans’ (2004: 735).34
The illusion from which Saint-Just suffered according to Williams was
the illusion of thinking that the values of ancient Rome were a live option
for revolutionary Paris—that these values could simply be transplanted from
antiquity into aworldwith completely different needs and social and economic
structures.The particular way in which a value such as freedomwas expressed
and concretely elaborated in ancient Rome may have answered to the needs
of Roman society. But as Williams points out, a value ‘can demand different
social and political expressions at different times’, and what makes a value
‘viable in one set of historical conditions may make it a disaster in another:
that was the nature of Saint-Just’s illusion’ (1995a: 137). Blind to the way in
33 See Williams (1995a). He takes the phrase fromMarx and Engels’The Holy Family.
34 See Linton (2010) and Andrew (2011: chs. 6 and 7) for accounts of how Saint-Just self-
consciously modelled himself and his ideals on those of the Roman republic. In this he was
but an extreme example of a general tendency among the revolutionaries.
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which the viability of particular expressions of values is a function of the socio-
historical context in which they are put to work, Saint-Just tried to impose
ideas on modern French society that were entirely alien to it and could never
have worked in it.
Now Nietzsche, in calling for a reversal of the Christian revaluation, like-
wise lays himself open to the charge of succumbing to Saint-Just’s illusion.
There is every reason to fear that what made virtù a viable alternative to Chris-
tian virtue in the Italian Renaissance will make it a disaster under conditions
of modernity—and Nietzsche’s enthusiastic pointer to Cesare Borgia is hardly
reassuring.
By interpreting Nietzsche’s project so that it can sidestep some of the
problems we highlighted above, then, we just render the project vulnerable
to the objection that the inference from the success of an older set of values
in their particular socio-historical circumstances to the idea that they will
similarly succeed under modern-day conditions is both a lapse of historical
sense and a dangerous ethical and political error.
Yet it turns out that Nietzsche appears to have been aware of that difficulty
as well. InThe Gay Science, he speaks to this very issue and even employs the
same example:
TheFrench of Corneille’s age as well as those of the Revolution seized Roman
antiquity in a way we no longer dare to—thanks to our higher historical
sense. And Roman antiquity itself: how violently and yet naively it laid its
hand on everything good and lofty in the older Greek antiquity! How they
translated things into the Roman present! . . . They seem to ask us: ‘Should
we not make new for ourselves what is old and put ourselves into it? Should
we not be allowed to breathe our soul into their dead body? For it is dead,
after all: how ugly everything dead is!’ They did not know the pleasure of a
sense for history. (GS: §83)
Nietzsche’s uses the phrase ‘historical sense’ in a variety of ways, but the
relevant sense here seems to be exactly the one at stake in Saint-Just’s illusion:
one betrays a lack of historical sense if one fails to grasp how past values were
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embedded in, and drew their point from, an entire form of life. As Nietzsche
writes in Human, All Too Human, the historical sense consists in the ability to
rapidly ‘conjure up a certain horizon’ or ‘system of ideas and sensations’, just
as one conjures up ‘the impression of a temple on the basis of a few pillars and
pieces of wall that chance to remain standing’ (HA: I, §274). In Beyond Good
and Evil, historical sense is characterized as the ability ‘quickly to guess the
rank order of the valuations that a people, a society, an individual has lived
by’ as well as the ‘connections between these valuations’ (BGE: §224). The
draft of this passage in his notebook revealingly adds: ‘the relation of these
valuations to the conditions of life, the relationship between the authority of
values and the authority of effective forces (the presumed relationship usually
even more than the actual one): the ability to reproduce all this in oneself is
what constitutes historical sense’ (eKGWB: 1885, 35[2]). On Nietzsche’s view,
one displays historical sense notably by grasping the connection between
valuations and the form of life in which they are embedded.
If one assumes that Nietzsche the philologist was too historical a thinker
to fall for Saint-Just’s illusion—if one assumes, in particular, that he was aware
of how the viability of particular expressions of values depends on the con-
text in which they are deployed—then the insight animating the charge of
Saint-Just’s illusion might be turned into a steppingstone by which to over-
come it. The tel quel transplantation of Renaissance conceptions into modern
society may founder on the fact that viable values demand new expressions
and elaborations in different socio-historical contexts; but this just shows that
what is needed are new expressions and elaborations of the values underlying
Renaissance conceptions, expressions and elaborations adapted to the mod-
ern context. What we should aim to recreate, therefore, is not the Renaissance
conception of virtue itself, but the benefits and possibilities it brought in its
wake. The guiding question will then be: what new elaborations and expres-
sions of values do new contexts demand in order to deliver the same goods as
past elaborations and expressions of those values in past contexts?
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There is some textual evidence to suggest that Nietzsche indeed under-
stood that values would require different expressions and elaborations in
different contexts. For example, he suggests at one point that the contest of val-
uations that concerns him unfolds throughout Western history, with two sets
of valuations re-emerging again and again in notably different guises (GM: I,
§16).
The crunch, however, is that even if Nietzsche is aware of the pitfalls
involved in Saint-Just’s illusion, this awareness can only drive him back to the
idea that what we need are values that, at least in their expression, elaboration,
and concretization, are not the recycled values of a bygone era, but values
which are adapted to our own, novel circumstances; and to the extent that they
are that, they will be precisely what we were trying to avoid, namely genuinely
new values whose anticipation and assessment must once again give rise to
the difficulties we started out from. The line of interpretation leading past
Saint-Just’s illusion thus runs into just the host of problems that the line of
interpretation leading to Saint-Just’s illusion was intended to get away from in
the first place.
On either interpretation of the revaluation of values as a project, then, the
Williamsian critique highlights serious difficulties for it, difficulties which
are neither specific to Nietzsche nor to the substance of his criterion. Perhaps
further reflection on these matters can show that some of these difficulties
can be overcome. But what the present discussion suggests is that they really
do need to be overcome, and the value of flagging these difficulties lies in the
guidance it offers in that regard, not only to those seeking an interpretation
of Nietzsche’s project on which it emerges as viable, but also—since the dif-
ficulties have not gone away—to those in conceptual ethics and conceptual
engineering who seek to continue what he began.35
35 I am grateful to Damian Cueni, Amia Srinivasan, Johannes Steizinger, Rebekka Hufendiek,
Jelscha Schmid, Markus Wild, David Owen, Friedemann Bieber, Alexander Prescott-Couch,
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